



**TRANSPARENCY  
INTERNATIONAL**



Rwanda

# RWANDA BRIBERY INDEX 2025



**Norwegian People's Aid**

**RWANDA BRIBERY  
INDEX 2025**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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The Rwanda Bribery Index (RBI) is an annual publication conducted by Transparency International Rwanda (TI-Rwanda) since 2010, with financial support from the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) through the PPIMA Project. This initiative aims to assess experiences and perceptions of bribery in Rwanda, aligning with Sustainable Development Goal 16, specifically Target 16.5: "Substantially reduce corruption and bribery."

RBI findings serve as a benchmark for TI-Rwanda's advocacy efforts, driving systemic change in the fight against corruption and promoting good governance in Rwanda. We take pride in the significant progress and commendable efforts made by the Government of Rwanda in combating corruption. This progress is reflected not only in the RBI findings but also in various corruption analyses and surveys, such as Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the East Africa Bribery Index (EABI).

On behalf of TI-Rwanda, I extend heartfelt gratitude to all those who made this critical study possible. I especially thank the citizens across the 11 districts where the 2025 study was conducted. Despite their busy schedules, they actively participated in the research, sharing their opinions and experiences of bribery through the administered questionnaires.

I also take this opportunity to acknowledge the outstanding efforts of the TI-Rwanda research team, led by Albert Rwego Kavatiri, TI-Rwanda's Programme Manager, whose expertise and dedication were instrumental to the success of this research.



Apollinaire Mupiganyi

TI-Rwanda Executive Director

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The 2025 Rwanda Bribery Index (RBI) presents a nuanced view of corruption in Rwanda, highlighting both significant progress and ongoing challenges. Public perception of corruption has improved, with more citizens expressing confidence in the government's anti-corruption efforts and optimism for further reductions in 2026. A majority of respondents believe that corruption has decreased somewhat over the past year, and many recognize the effectiveness of reforms in enforcement, transparency, and governance. Despite this progress, systemic vulnerabilities remain, particularly in sectors involving high public contact and discretionary authority, such as local government, tax administration, utilities, construction, and business-related transactions.

Bribery in Rwanda is largely driven by inefficiencies, exclusion, and economic pressures rather than solely by abuse of power. In 2025, the most common motivation for paying a bribe was to speed up service delivery, followed by the need to access services otherwise unavailable or obtaining services to which citizens were not legally entitled. The private sector registered the highest prevalence and likelihood of bribery, reflecting informal practices in business transactions, while local government, the traffic police, REG, and RRA also showed notable risks. Strategic bribery among business actors remains a concern, with bribes used deliberately to secure competitive advantages, although overall coercive demands have declined.

The average amount of bribes paid in 2025 increased sharply to 262,148 Rwf, nearly triple the previous year, indicating a shift toward high-value, institutionalized corruption, particularly in regulatory and service delivery sectors such as RURA, medical services, and RRA. Meanwhile, corruption reporting remains critically low, with only 9.5% of citizens coming forward. Major barriers include fear of retaliation, distrust in institutions, lack of awareness of reporting mechanisms, and perceptions that reporting will not result in action. Even among those who report, more than half observe no meaningful follow-up, further undermining public trust.

The report recommends targeted, actionable measures across key institutions. For the private sector, mandatory service charters, integrity pacts, and ethics training are suggested. For traffic police, anonymous reporting channels and expanded body camera coverage are advised. Local government reforms should include independent oversight panels, full e-procurement, citizen monitoring of projects, and ethics training for construction inspectors. WASAC and REG should appoint anti-corruption focal persons and establish joint whistleblowing hotlines in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Rwanda has made notable strides in reducing petty corruption and improving public confidence. However, the persistence of high-value corruption in strategic sectors, coupled with low reporting rates, underscores the need for deeper institutional reforms. Sustaining progress will require strengthened enforcement, greater transparency, accessible reporting mechanisms, and enhanced citizen empowerment to ensure that corruption is not only reduced in prevalence and perception but actively challenged and prevented across society.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

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Corruption and bribery remain among the most harmful obstacles to social and economic development worldwide. They weaken trust in institutions, undermine fairness, block inclusive growth, and contribute to inequality and organized crime. When left unchecked, corrupt practices also erode democratic values and discourage investments, making it difficult for governments and private actors to deliver services effectively.

The effects of corruption often fall hardest on vulnerable groups. People with lower levels of income or education are more likely to face bribe demands because they have limited capacity to resist officials or service providers who misuse their authority. This imbalance reflects a lack of power: the poor often have little awareness of their rights, limited resources to defend them, and little influence to hold institutions accountable. As a result, they are easy targets for exploitation.

Research shows that factors shaping an individual's involvement in corruption include their personal moral beliefs, how peers view corruption, and the challenges of complying with complex rules and procedures. Combating corruption therefore requires not only enforcement but also greater understanding of how and where corruption happens. Evidence-based tools are needed to measure its occurrence, monitor progress, and inform stronger responses.

It is within this framework that the Rwanda Bribery Index (RBI) is developed. The RBI is an annual survey carried out by Transparency International Rwanda to measure the extent and nature of bribery in both public and private institutions. It identifies sectors most exposed to corruption, highlights the impact of bribery on citizens and businesses, and provides evidence to guide policies and reforms. The RBI also plays an advocacy role, creating a platform where government, private sector, civil society, and media come together to discuss risks, push for accountability, and strengthen anti-corruption action in Rwanda.

## 2. OBJECTIVE OF THE SURVEY

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The overall objective of the study was to establish the experiences and perceptions of Rwandans with regard to service delivery and corruption in the county.

### **The specific objectives of the survey include:**

- ❖ Determine the prevalence (evidence and perception) of corruption on Rwanda as reported by Rwandan Households;
- ❖ Identify Rwandan Institutions and Organizations particularly vulnerable to corruption;
- ❖ Assess the impact of corruption on service delivery in Rwanda;
- ❖ Gather concrete information on the size of bribes paid by Rwandan citizens while seeking to access a specific service.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

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#### 3.1. Approach

This survey used exclusively a quantitative approach and seek to establish the extent of bribe in Rwanda by seeking information from ordinary citizens while interacting with public officials. Furthermore, the survey used both random and purposive technique. The purposive technique enabled urban districts to be included in the sample as they are more likely to provide more services than rural areas hence, higher risk of corruption. The questionnaire was the only instrument to capture data on bribery incidences. The latter has been introduced into tablets with the kobo tool box application and it was used by well trained and skilled interviewers to collect data from Rwandan citizens aged 18 years and above.

#### 3.2. Sampling frame and sample size

Rwanda Bribery Index 2025 like the previous ones, is a nationwide survey. The sample size was computed on the basis of various parameters such as the desired degree of precision, target population size, timing and budget. The study population was taken from the 2024 census. The choice was due to the fact that this survey is measuring people's experience of bribery in the last 12 months. The sample is calculated using the formula below.

$$n = (N(zs/e)^2)/(N-1+(zs/e)^2)$$

Where:

**z** = 1.96 for 95% level of confidence


**s** = p(1-p) where p = estimated proportion

**e** = desired margin of error

**N** = population size

In this estimation the significance level is taken as 95% with a margin of error of 2%. Such a sample size provides a base for meaningful comparison to undertake statistically valid sub stratifications that fall within acceptable confidence level. The minimum sample size is calculated on the basis of the Rao soft sample size calculator. The sample size for the RBI 2025 survey is rounded to 2,360 respondents.

**Figure 1: District sample allocation**



Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

### 3.3. Data collection

The data collection was performed by skilled enumerators and team leaders recruited and trained to this end. The training covered issues such as survey methods, questionnaire structure and content, enumerator’s/supervisors’ responsibilities, survey ethics and the use of tablets for data collection. The questionnaire was administered to sampled respondents aged 18 years and above. For the sake of efficiency and data quality assurance, the questionnaire was tablet-based and relied on CsPro software. Similarly, for efficiency purpose, enumerators were requested to meet respondents in their respective households for the data collection purpose. Respondents were selected randomly based on the list availed by the head of villages included in the survey sample.

Before starting the data collection process, a “pilot survey” was organized in a sector other than those which were covered by the actual survey. The pilot survey allowed testing the research tools with regard to the clarity, wording, coherence and consistency of the questions. It also served as an opportunity for enumerators and supervisors to get used to the tools they have to use during the actual survey (especially getting used to CsPro and the use of tablets).

### 3.4. Quality control

In a bid to ensure data quality, the data collection activity was implemented by enumerators while team leaders and supervisors were responsible for supervision and coordination. Supervisors include TI-RW's researchers while team leaders were recruited based on their experience in carrying out such exercise. For data quality control purposes, the following measures were taken:

1. Assessment and approval of the RBI tools and methodology by the NISR;
2. Recruitment of skilled interviewers and supervisors
3. Training of interviewers and supervisors
4. Setting the questionnaire in Kobo Toolbox and introducing it into tablets
5. Testing of the questionnaires
6. Supervision of data collection activity
7. Overall coordination of the field work
8. Use of SPSS software for data analysis
9. Data cleaning prior to analysis

### 3.5. Data analysis

As it has been highlighted above, quantitative data were collected using a questionnaire already set in CsPro and installed on the tablets to avoid the use of papers and the need to conduct data entry later. Data introduced in the tablets were exported in SPSS, cleaned and analyzed by the statistician using SPSS software. In the framework of controlling all the information generated in this survey, all data were entered in the tablets as they are collected and then submitted to the national supervisor on a daily basis. This allowed monitoring the progress of the research, ensure quality and safety of data collected. The Rwanda Bribery Index is analyzed through Eight indicators with five indicators measuring the victimization of corruption and 3 perception- based indicators as follows:

1. **Likelihood** =  $\frac{\text{\# of bribe demand situation for organization } x}{\text{\# of interactions for organization } x}$
2. **Prevalence** =  $\frac{\text{\# of bribe payers for organization } x}{\text{\# of interactions for organization } x}$

3. **Impact** =  $\frac{\text{\# of service deliveries as a result of bribe paying for organization x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organization x}}$
4. **Share** =  $\frac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organization x}}{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in all organizations}}$
5. **Average size** =  $\frac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organization x}}{\text{Individuals who paid a bribe in organization x.}}$
6. **Perceived current level of corruption**
7. **Level of government's commitment to fight corruption**
8. **Perceived causes of corruption**

## 4. PARTNERSHIP IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN RWANDA: REALITY AND GAPS

---

The fight against corruption in Rwanda is a collective national endeavor that engages government institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs), the media, the private sector, and communities. This multisectoral approach is grounded in a robust legal and policy framework that has evolved since the adoption of the 2003 Constitution. Over the past two decades, Rwanda has enacted a series of laws and strategic instruments including the Leadership Code of Conduct, the Anti-Corruption Law, the Access to Information Act, Whistleblower Protection Laws, and Vision 2050 all aimed at building a resilient integrity system and promoting ethical governance.

This framework reflects a deliberate shift from reactive enforcement to proactive prevention. It recognizes that corruption is not only a legal violation but also a governance challenge that requires coordinated action across sectors. Institutions such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB), the National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA), and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) have been established or strengthened to detect, investigate, and prosecute corruption-related offenses. Their mandates are complemented by oversight bodies like the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), parliamentary committees, and regulatory agencies that monitor compliance and promote transparency in public finance and procurement.

Beyond institutional architecture, Rwanda's anti-corruption strategy emphasizes citizen engagement and accountability. Mechanisms such as community scorecards, integrity clubs, and public reporting platforms have been introduced to empower citizens to monitor service delivery and report misconduct. The media and civil society play a critical role in raising awareness, exposing irregularities, and advocating for reform. These efforts are supported by digital tools and e-governance platforms that reduce human discretion and increase traceability in administrative processes.

International cooperation has also contributed to Rwanda's progress. By ratifying regional and global conventions, the country has aligned its practices with international standards and benefited from technical assistance, peer learning, and cross-border collaboration. These partnerships have helped build institutional capacity and introduced innovative approaches to financial oversight, asset recovery, and legal reform.

Despite these advances, corruption remains a dynamic and multifaceted challenge. As Rwanda's governance systems become more sophisticated, so do the risks—ranging from

procurement manipulation and regulatory capture to cyber-enabled fraud and illicit financial flows. Addressing these emerging threats requires continuous adaptation, stronger enforcement, and inclusive participation.

This literature review explores both the practical realities and the persistent gaps within Rwanda's anti-corruption landscape. It examines the strengths and limitations of institutional efforts, identifies areas where progress has been made, and highlights where further attention is needed to ensure that reforms translate into lasting impact.

### **1. Justice has been central in holding corruption offenders accountable.**

The fight against corruption in Rwanda has relied heavily on ensuring that those who misuse public trust are investigated and punished. Justice plays a vital role in strengthening accountability because prosecutions send a clear message that corruption is not tolerated. The reality is that Rwanda has successfully investigated and prosecuted several corruption cases, which has built public confidence that even powerful individuals are not immune to the law. Institutions such as the National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA) and the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB) have been key in handling these cases, ensuring that offenders are not shielded from justice (Hakizimana, 2025). However, the complexity of financial crimes poses challenges. Many cases take a long time to conclude because the justice sector lacks sufficient expertise in specialized areas such as forensic accounting, cybercrime, and asset recovery. This gap delays justice and weakens the deterrent effect of prosecutions.

### **2. Audit reports have improved transparency in public finance management.**

Transparency in the management of public resources has been significantly enhanced through regular audits. These audits provide both the government and citizens with a clear picture of where funds are well managed and where problems exist. In Rwanda, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) plays a critical role by releasing annual reports that highlight mismanagement of public resources, including idle assets, delayed contracts, and repeated failures to implement prior recommendations (Office of the Auditor General of Rwanda, 2024). Parliament, particularly through its Public Accounts Committee (PAC), then follows up on these findings by summoning officials, asking questions, and demanding accountability. This process creates pressure for institutions to be more careful in how they manage public money. However, the challenge lies in enforcement. While problems are identified and officials are questioned, many recommendations are not implemented quickly. In some cases, the same issues appear in multiple reports, showing that corrective

measures are either ignored or delayed. This gap reduces the overall impact of the audit process and limits its power as a deterrent against mismanagement.

### **3. Asset declarations have promoted accountability among leaders.**

According to Transparency International, requiring public officials to declare their assets is a proven preventive tool against corruption, as it promotes transparency and reduces opportunities for illicit enrichment (Transparency International, 2024). This measure has promoted ethical leadership and reinforced a culture of accountability in the public sector. In Rwanda, the Office of the Ombudsman has spearheaded this initiative by requiring regular declarations and providing citizens with channels to report misconduct. While the system has improved openness, its effectiveness is undermined by weak verification mechanisms. Declarations are not always cross-checked against tax records, bank data, or property registries, which allows some leaders to underreport their wealth or hide ownership of assets. Without thorough verification, asset declarations risk becoming a formality rather than a strong anti-corruption safeguard.

### **4. Procurement reforms have enhanced fairness in public contracting.**

Fairness in awarding contracts is a cornerstone of good governance, and Rwanda has made strides in reducing opportunities for favoritism and bribery. Clear procurement regulations and digital tools such as e-procurement have been introduced to ensure transparency and reduce human interference in contract decisions. These reforms, led by the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA), have increased confidence in the system among both citizens and businesses. Despite this progress, challenges persist at the local level. Oversight mechanisms in districts and sectors are weaker, meaning irregularities and loopholes still exist. For instance some local officials struggle to fully comply with national standards, creating opportunities for corrupt actors to exploit the system. According to TI-RW (2021) bidders have confirmed the issues of having some members in tender committee with no enough required technical expertise, existence of collusion among bidders and existence of collusion between procurement staff and bidders. This uneven implementation shows that while the framework is strong at the national level, local-level compliance still requires more attention.

### **5. Financial intelligence has strengthened detection of money laundering.**

Protecting the financial system from abuse is essential in fighting corruption and related crimes. Rwanda has strengthened its capacity to detect and prevent suspicious transactions that may involve money laundering or illicit financial flows. The Financial

Intelligence Centre (FIC) has been central to this process, collecting and analyzing data to identify unusual activities in the financial system. Its creation marked a strategic shift toward compliance with international financial standards and enhanced Rwanda's ability to respond to complex corruption schemes (Bizimungu, 2025). However, the reality is that financial crimes are becoming increasingly sophisticated, often involving international transactions, shell companies, and hidden assets. Addressing such challenges requires highly specialized skills such as forensic financial analysis and advanced investigative techniques. Rwanda still faces gaps in this area, which makes it difficult to fully track and dismantle complex schemes.

## **6. Law enforcement agencies have encouraged public reporting of corruption.**

Encouraging citizens to report corruption has been an important part of Rwanda's anti-corruption efforts. Law enforcement agencies have made progress in creating accessible channels for the public to share information and report wrongdoing. As part of this effort, the government encourages citizens to report suspected corruption cases through hotlines and secure reporting systems, ensuring anonymity and reducing fear of retaliation (Makuru, 2024). Both the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB) and the Rwanda National Police (RNP) have taken action against offenders, demonstrating that citizen reports are taken seriously. This has improved public trust in the system, as people can see that their voices matter. However, challenges remain in the coordination of reporting mechanisms. Multiple institutions provide different hotlines and channels, which can confuse citizens about where to report cases. This lack of clarity sometimes discourages people from coming forward, leaving some corruption cases unreported and unaddressed.

## **7. Parliament has advanced anti-corruption laws and oversight.**

The role of Parliament in fighting corruption has been evident in its oversight and lawmaking functions. Through debates and committees such as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption (APNAC), Members of Parliament have raised issues of governance and demanded accountability from government officials (Harutyunyan, 2021). This strengthens the system of checks and balances and ensures that corruption is openly discussed in national forums. Despite these efforts, there is a persistent gap between raising issues and ensuring implementation. Recommendations made by Parliament often face delays in execution by government institutions. This slows down the process of reform and reduces the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight in tackling corruption.

## **8. Governance monitoring has promoted accountability and citizen engagement.**

Monitoring government performance and encouraging citizen participation are key strategies in building accountability. Rwanda has promoted these approaches by measuring governance performance and involving communities in decision-making processes. As highlighted in a systematic review by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, interventions such as performance information provision and participatory planning can strengthen citizen engagement and improve service delivery (Arangüena, 2024). The Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) has played a significant role in facilitating these efforts, strengthening the relationship between government and citizens. While this approach has created channels for participation, many citizens remain hesitant to engage fully. Fear of retaliation, lack of trust in the effectiveness of participation, and limited awareness prevent citizens from actively contributing. This weakens the overall impact of governance monitoring initiatives.

## **9. Corporate governance standards have boosted investment confidence.**

The private sector plays a crucial role in shaping the overall fight against corruption, and Rwanda has worked to promote integrity in business practices. Enforcing corporate governance standards has attracted investors by creating a more transparent and predictable business environment. The Rwanda Development Board (RDB) has been at the forefront of ensuring compliance with these standards. As Akinsola et al. (2025) note, regulatory enforcement of governance standards is key to reducing misconduct and enhancing market integrity. However, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often lack internal compliance mechanisms and effective controls. This makes them more vulnerable to engaging in corrupt practices, such as bribery in procurement processes or collusion with officials. Without stronger enforcement and support for SMEs, these weaknesses remain a risk to the integrity of the private sector.

## **10. Civil society has extended anti-corruption efforts to the grassroots level.**

Civil society has been essential in raising awareness, educating citizens about their rights, and creating grassroots accountability structures. Organizations have developed programs such as hotlines, legal aid clinics, and integrity clubs in schools, ensuring that anti-corruption values are instilled across communities. These efforts complement government initiatives by reaching ordinary citizens directly. As noted in Sociology Institute (2023), civil society plays a vital role in fostering democratic participation and promoting social justice, particularly by empowering marginalized populations and holding governments accountable. However, sustainability is a concern. Many civil society organizations (CSOs)

rely heavily on donor funding, which means their programs risk collapsing when funding cycles end. This donor dependence creates uncertainty and limits the long-term impact of CSOs in the fight against corruption.

### **11. Media has acted as a watchdog against corruption.**

Investigative journalism has given citizens access to information that would otherwise remain hidden, making the media an important actor in exposing corruption. By uncovering cases and raising public awareness, journalists have put pressure on leaders to act responsibly. This has created an additional layer of accountability, complementing formal institutions. As emphasized by the African Union (2022), “the Media remain a practical and effective tool to foster awareness on corruption, as well as voices that demand accountability and transparency from the public and private sectors.” Rwanda’s media landscape generally permits open reporting on corruption-related matters, and several outlets have demonstrated professionalism in evidence-based reporting. To enhance impact, continued investment in investigative capacity, access to public information, and structured collaboration between media and anti-corruption institutions will be essential.

### **12. Communities have played a key role in holding leaders accountable.**

Citizen involvement at the community level ensures that anti-corruption efforts are not only top-down but also grassroots-driven. Tools such as community scorecards, citizen forums, and participatory monitoring mechanisms have given people the power to question their leaders and influence service delivery. This participation has created more inclusive accountability processes. According to Kolevsohn (2025), grassroots movements and civil society organisations mobilise communities, amplify marginalised voices, and serve as critical links between citizens and formal oversight institutions. In Rwanda, such approaches have helped foster local ownership of anti-corruption initiatives. However, surveys show that many citizens still hesitate to report corruption or challenge leaders. Common reasons include fear of retaliation, lack of trust in reporting mechanisms, and the belief that reporting will not lead to real change. This silence allows corruption to persist in some communities.

### **13. International partnerships have strengthened Rwanda’s anti-corruption capacity.**

Working with regional and international partners has boosted Rwanda’s capacity to address corruption and align with global standards. Ratifying conventions such as the

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the UN Convention Against Corruption has placed Rwanda within strong global frameworks. Donor-supported initiatives have also introduced new tools and built institutional capacity. While these partnerships are vital, they often face sustainability challenges. Most support is project-based and time-limited, which means that once projects end, key initiatives may not be maintained. In addition, cross-border cooperation, especially in recovering stolen assets hidden abroad, is often slow and difficult, limiting the effectiveness of these partnerships.

## 5. PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS


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### 5.1. DEMOGRAPHICS


This section describes key demographic variables of the respondents who took part in this survey such as: age, gender, type of residence, level of education, employment status and income as shown in the figures below.

#### Distribution of respondents by selected demographic variables

*Figure 3: Type of residence*



*Figure 2: Gender of respondents*




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

The urban-rural split shows that 44.53% of the population resides in urban areas, while a larger portion, 55.47%, lives in rural areas. Urban areas might experience different types of corruption compared to rural areas, such as more complex bureaucratic corruption in cities versus petty corruption in rural areas.

The gender distribution reveals a slight male majority, with males constituting 53.56% of the population and females making up 46.44%. Gender dynamics can play a significant role in corruption, with women often being more vulnerable to certain types of corruption, such as sexual extortion.

**Figure 4: Level of Education**




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

In 2025, secondary education forms the largest share of the sample at 40.08%, followed by primary education at 36.23%. This indicates that most respondents have basic formal schooling, but relatively few have progressed to advanced levels. Only 13.01% hold university degrees, and just 4.15% have vocational training, while 6.53% have no formal education. This limited access to higher and technical education may affect how individuals engage with public institutions. Those with lower education levels are often less familiar with administrative procedures and legal protections, making them more vulnerable to informal payments, or exploitative practices when seeking services.

Similarly, those with university or TVET backgrounds may be better positioned to identify and report corruption, especially in complex institutional settings.


**Figure 5: Age Groups**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

Respondents aged 35-39 make up the largest group at 22.58%, followed by those aged 40-44 (18.51%) and 30-34 (14.66%). This shows that most participants are in their working years, likely dealing with public services such as employment, land, and family-related matters. Younger people aged 18-24 are fewer at 6.02%, and older adults above 50 make up a small portion of the sample. This age pattern suggests that the survey mostly captures the views of those who regularly interact with institutions and may be more exposed to corruption in everyday services.


**Figure 6: Occupation**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

A notable share of respondents (27.58%) are business owners, followed by private sector employees (23.94%) and those working in family businesses or farms (20.93%). Farmers also represent a significant portion at 17.71%. Together, these groups reflect a workforce largely engaged in informal and semi-formal economic activities. Public sector employees, students, and the unemployed each account for less than 3%, indicating limited representation from those directly involved in government institutions or outside the labor market. This occupational profile matters for corruption analysis: individuals in business and informal sectors often interact with licensing offices, tax agents, and local authorities, where petty corruption is more likely to occur. Their experiences provide insight into everyday challenges in accessing services and navigating regulatory systems.

**Figure 7: Family Monthly Income**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

Among respondents, 37.67% report a monthly family income between 31,000 and 100,000 Rwf, making this the most represented income bracket. An additional 23.01% fall within the 11,000–30,000 Rwf range, while 10.55% earn less than 10,000 Rwf. On the higher end, 17.58% report incomes between 101,000 and 200,000 Rwf, and only 11.19% exceed 200,000 Rwf. This income distribution indicates that the majority of families operate within modest financial means. Limited income can increase vulnerability to petty corruption, especially when accessing essential services such as healthcare, education, or administrative support. Households with fewer resources may feel compelled to offer informal payments to avoid delays or secure basic entitlements, making economic status a key factor in corruption exposure.


**5.2. Perception of corruption in Rwanda 2025**

In this study, the perception of corruption is examined through three dimensions including the current state of corruption, perceived causes of corruption and the perception on the effort of the government of Rwanda to fight against corruption.

**5.2.1. Perception on the current state of corruption in Rwanda (2025)**

On annual basis since 2010, the Rwanda Bribery index has been showing the extent to which Rwandans perceive corruption in general. This year (2025), respondents have provided their views on whether corruption in Rwanda is very low, low, medium or high.

**Figure 8: Perception on the current state of corruption in Rwanda (2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**


Perception of corruption in Rwanda has shifted notably between 2020 and 2025. In 2025, 45.20% of respondents view corruption as very low, marking the highest level of optimism across the six-year period. The current data shows a decline in high corruption perception from 20.5% in 2020 to 13.20% in 2025, suggesting improved public confidence in anti-corruption efforts. These shifts may reflect the impact of reforms, increased transparency, or more visible enforcement actions. The data aligns with the research objective of tracking public sentiment over time and identifying whether institutional changes are translating into perceived improvements. It also helps pinpoint years where public trust dipped, guiding future policy adjustments.

### 5.3. Perceived reasons for paying bribe 2025

The most common reason respondents gave for paying a bribe in 2025 was to speed up service delivery, cited by 42% of participants. This suggests that delays and inefficiencies in public institutions remain a major driver of corrupt transactions. Another 20% reported

that bribery was the only way to access a service, pointing to systemic barriers that exclude citizens from their entitlements unless they pay informally. Notably, 19% admitted to paying bribes to access services they were not legally entitled to, which reflects both institutional weaknesses and individual complicity. Smaller shares paid to avoid problems with authorities (7%) or to reduce the official cost of a service (6%). These motivations highlight how corruption is often embedded in everyday interactions, shaped by both administrative shortcomings and economic pressures. This data directly supports the research objective of identifying the nature and drivers of bribery. It shows that corruption is not only a matter of abuse of power but also a response to inefficiency, exclusion, and financial strain especially among those navigating public services without clear guidance or protection.

**Figure 9: Perceived reasons for paying bribe**




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

#### 5.4. Perception on whether over the past year corruption has decreased in Rwanda

More than half of respondents 54.96% believe that corruption has “decreased somewhat” over the past year, while 11.27% say it has “decreased a lot.” This suggests growing public confidence in anti-corruption efforts, possibly linked to recent reforms or improved service delivery. Meanwhile, 18.86% feel that corruption levels have remained the same, and only 9.49% perceive an increase, either slight or significant. These findings are important for assessing the impact of institutional changes. A decline in perceived corruption may reflect better enforcement, greater transparency, or more responsive governance. However, the presence of nearly one-fifth of respondents who see no change and a small group who still perceive worsening conditions indicates that challenges remain. This perception data supports the research objective of evaluating progress over time and identifying areas where public trust still needs to be strengthened.

**Figure 10: Perception on whether corruption has decreased in Rwanda (2025)**




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

#### 5.5. Expectations for corruption in 2026

Most respondents (66.27%) believe that corruption will decrease in 2026, reflecting strong public optimism about ongoing reforms and institutional improvements. Only 5.47% expect corruption to increase, while 14.70% think it will remain the same. Another 13.56% are uncertain. This forward-looking perception reinforces the idea that recent anti-corruption efforts are gaining public trust. It also aligns with the research objective of

assessing not just current experiences, but expectations for future governance. When citizens anticipate improvement, it suggests that policy measures such as increased transparency, enforcement, or citizen engagement are beginning to resonate. However, the presence of uncertainty and a small group anticipating worsening conditions highlights the need for continued vigilance and inclusive communication to sustain momentum.

**Figure 11: Expectations for corruption in 2026**




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

**5.6. Respondents’ views about the effort of the government in fighting against corruption in the country**

Public perception of the government’s anti-corruption efforts has steadily improved from 2021 to 2025. In the most recent data, 34.10% of respondents rated the efforts as “very effective,” up from 22.30% in 2021. Similarly, 51.96% described them as “somewhat effective,” maintaining a consistently high level since 2022. Meanwhile, neutral or negative ratings have declined: only 8.20% now view the efforts as neither effective nor ineffective, and just 4.10% consider them somewhat ineffective. The “very ineffective” category has nearly disappeared, dropping to 0.27%. This upward trend suggests that citizens are increasingly recognizing and valuing the government’s initiatives to combat corruption. It supports the research objective of evaluating institutional performance and public trust over time. The decline in negative perceptions also indicates that reforms whether in enforcement, transparency, or service delivery are beginning to resonate with the public. However, the persistence of moderate ratings shows that expectations remain high, and

further improvements are still needed to fully satisfy public demand for integrity and accountability.

**Figure 12: Trend about the government’s efforts in the fight against corruption (2021 – 2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**


**5.7. Personal experience with bribery**

Beside the perception of corruption, the Rwanda Bribery Index analyses the experience of bribes encountered by respondents in accordance with the number of their interaction with service providers. The section below describes the personal experience of respondents with bribe encountered, demanded and paid while seeking for services in selected institutions and services.

**5.7.1. Bribe encountered**

Bribe encountered refers to both bribes demanded and offered. The Figure below shows the proportion of citizens who have demanded or offered bribes while interacting with service providers in the last Twelve months.

**Figure 13: Bribe encountered (2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

In 2025, 14.60% of respondents reported encountering bribery, 12.30% experienced direct demands, and 2.30% admitted to proposing a bribe. While 85.40% did not report any involvement, this does not necessarily imply absence of corruption. It may reflect hesitation to disclose such experiences due to fear, confusion, or limited trust in reporting systems.

The fact that bribe demands exceed voluntary offers suggests that institutional weaknesses rather than citizen intent are driving petty corruption. This points to gaps in service delivery, oversight, and enforcement. Moreover, the low rate of self-reported complicity raises concerns about the effectiveness of verification mechanisms, especially in asset declaration and financial tracking.


Overall, the data reveals that while progress has been made, informal practices persist in areas where systems are slow, unclear, or poorly monitored. Strengthening frontline accountability and simplifying reporting channels remain essential to reducing everyday corruption.

### **5.7.2. Bribery encounter over time (2012-2025)**

From 2022 to 2025, the percentage of people encountering bribery in Rwanda declined from 18.50% to 14.60%. This steady decrease suggests that recent reforms in enforcement,

procurement transparency, and citizen engagement may be contributing to a reduction in petty corruption. The drop follows a sharp peak in 2021, when bribery encounters reached 29.10%, likely influenced by institutional strain and service delivery challenges during the COVID-19 period. While the current figures are encouraging, the continued presence of bribery at lower levels indicates that challenges remain, particularly in frontline service delivery and local oversight. Sustaining this downward trend will require consistent investment in accountability mechanisms, simplified reporting systems, and stronger coordination across institutions.

**Figure 14: Bribe encounter trend in Rwanda (2012 - 2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**


**5.8. Likelihood of bribe occurrence**

The likelihood of bribery refers to the extent to which bribes were demanded by service providers while interacting with service seekers in the last Twelve months. The figure below presents the national average of likelihood of bribe in Rwanda for the period 2018-2025.

Between 2018 and 2021, the likelihood remained relatively low, ranging from 3.20% to 4.00%. In 2022, there was a noticeable increase to 7.30%, suggesting a temporary rise in bribery risk. This may have been influenced by disruptions in service delivery or other pressures during that period. In the years that followed, the figures dropped steadily 3.60% in 2023, 3.20% in 2024, and 2.50% in 2025.

This recent decline shows that fewer people are experiencing direct bribery demands compared to previous years. While the 2022 spike stands out, the overall trend from 2023 onward suggests a return to lower levels, indicating a more stable environment in terms of public service interactions.

**Figure 15: Likelihood of bribe (National average 2018 – 2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

**5.8.1. Likelihood of Bribe by Institutions in 2025**

In 2025, the likelihood of bribery varied significantly across institutions, with the private sector registering the highest rate at 8.90%. This suggests that informal practices may still be present in business transactions, particularly where regulatory oversight is limited or discretionary power is high. Both the Rwanda National Police (RNP) and Local Government (LG) followed with equal likelihoods of 6.20%, indicating that interactions involving law enforcement and decentralized administrative services remain areas of concern.


Prosecutors (3.10%), REG (4.20%), and WASAC (4.00%) also showed moderate likelihoods, pointing to vulnerabilities in utility services and legal processes. Institutions such as RIB (2.70%), universities (2.60%), and judges (2.60%) reported lower figures, though their presence on the list suggests that no sector is entirely immune to misconduct risks.

At the lower end of the spectrum, regulatory bodies like RURA (2.04%) and RRA (1.80%) showed relatively low likelihoods, while educational institutions secondary schools (1.08%), TVET centers (1.04%), and primary schools (0.20%) registered minimal risk. Banks recorded

the lowest likelihood at just 0.40%, reflecting stronger formal controls and limited discretionary interaction with the public.


Overall, the data illustrates that while some institutions have made progress in reducing bribery risks, others particularly those with frequent public contact or service delivery roles continue to face challenges.

**Figure 16: Likelihood of bribe in (2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

Figure 17: Comparison of likelihood of bribery (2021 – 2025)




Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

## 5.9. Prevalence of bribery in 2025

This section provides the probability of paying bribes (prevalence) to service providers in Rwanda while interacting with the service seekers in the last 12 months. The figure below presents the outcome.

**Figure 18: Prevalence of Bribe in Rwanda (2018 – 2025)**




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

From 2018 to 2021, prevalence remained relatively low and stable, fluctuating between 2% and 2.80%. In 2022, however, there was a sharp increase to 4.50%, marking the highest point in the eight-year period. This spike may reflect temporary pressures in service delivery or weakened oversight during that year. The trend reversed in 2023, dropping to 2.60%, and continued to decline through 2024 (2.10%) and 2025 (1.50%).

This steady reduction from 2022 onward suggests that fewer individuals are being compelled to pay bribes, indicating a possible shift in public service practices or citizen behavior. While the 2022 peak highlights a moment of concern, the consistent decline in subsequent years points to improving conditions in service interactions and a reduction in transactional corruption.

### 5.9.1. Prevalence by institutions in 2025


**Figure 19: Prevalence of bribe by institutions**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

In 2025, the prevalence of bribery defined as the proportion of individuals who reported actually paying a bribe varied across institutions, with the private sector leading at 8.00%. This suggests that informal payments remain relatively common in business-related transactions. According to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2025), private sector corruption often involves collusion with public officials, especially in procurement, licensing, and regulatory approvals, where bribes are used to gain unfair advantages or expedite services. Local Government followed at 4.30%, indicating continued challenges in decentralized service delivery. REG (3.70%) and Prosecutors (3.50%) also registered notable prevalence, pointing to vulnerabilities in utility access and legal processes. WASAC (2.80%) and RURA (2.04%) showed moderate levels, while RRA (1.40%), RNP, Judges, and RIB (each at 1.20%) reflected lower but still present risks. Educational institutions such as secondary schools (1.02%), universities (0.90%), TVET (0.30%), and primary schools (0.10%) reported minimal prevalence, with banks also low at 0.50%. Overall, the data suggests that while bribery remains a concern in certain sectors particularly those involving direct service provision most institutions show relatively low levels of reported payment, indicating progress in curbing transactional corruption.


**Figure 20: Trend of the prevalence of bribe in selected institutions (2020 - 2025)**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

## 5.10. Services with highest bribe payment in 2025

Figure 21: Services with highest bribe payment in 2025



Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

In 2025, the most commonly reported irregularity was illegal construction in areas not permitted by the master plan, with 52.40% of respondents indicating such cases highlighting persistent challenges in urban planning enforcement. Obtaining construction permits through informal means followed at 34.90%, suggesting that access to regulated infrastructure remains vulnerable to manipulation. According to Colonnelli and Haas (2016), the construction sector is particularly prone to corruption due to the large volume of funds involved, complex procurement processes, and weak oversight mechanisms. The authors note that inflated budgets, delayed audits, and blurred lines between regulators and contractors make it easier for informal practices to flourish, especially in infrastructure-heavy environments. The school feeding program under the 12-Year Basic Education initiative registered a 25% prevalence, pointing to concerns in resource allocation or delivery. Driving licenses acquired illegally through traffic services stood at

19.40%, while recruitment in the private sector showed a 17.40% prevalence, indicating potential favoritism or informal gatekeeping. Public transport tendering and securing work locations (16.60%), TVET admissions (16.60%), and expediting court cases (16.00%) all reflect areas where procedural shortcuts are reportedly common. Access to utilities also showed signs of informality, with 14.00% reporting irregularities in electricity connection and 13.70% in water service delivery. These figures suggest that while some sectors are improving, others particularly construction, licensing, and service access continue to face systemic pressures that enable informal practices.

**5.11. Prevalence and LIKELIHOOD of bribe among busing people in 2025**

*Figure 22: Bribe occurrences among the business community (SDG16.5.1 and SDG 16.5.2)*




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

In 2025, bribery within Rwanda’s business community showed a layered dynamic. While 4.20% of business people reported being asked to pay a bribe, only 1.14% actually did so suggesting that a majority resisted or avoided the demand. However, a separate figure reveals that 10.70% paid bribes specifically for business-related purposes, such as securing contracts, licenses, or favorable treatment. This gap between general bribery requests and targeted business transactions points to a more strategic use of informal payments, where bribes are not just reactive but deliberately used to gain competitive advantage. The data underscores the need to distinguish between opportunistic corruption and systemic practices embedded in commercial operations.

### 5.11.1. Trend of Prevalence and Likelihood of Bribe among Business People

Figure 23: Trend of prevalence and likelihood of bribe among business people – SDG 16.5




Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

Between 2021 and 2025, the dynamics of bribery among business people in Rwanda shifted significantly. In 2021, 20% reported being demanded to pay a bribe, 8.20% actually paid, while a striking 33% paid specifically for business purposes suggesting that informal payments were often used strategically rather than reactively. In 2022, the figures rose across all categories: 23.50% were demanded to pay, 12.80% complied, and 38% paid for business-related gains, marking the peak of business-purpose bribery. However, 2023 saw a dramatic reversal. Only 8% were asked to pay, 5.10% paid, yet 42% paid for business purposes indicating a shift toward targeted, transactional bribery even as general pressure declined. In 2024, the trend softened: 7.20% were demanded to pay, 3.40% paid, and 32% paid for business reasons. By 2025, all indicators dropped sharply just 4.20% were asked to pay, 1.14% paid, and 10.70% did so for business purposes. This final year reflects a significant reduction in both coercive and strategic bribery, suggesting improved institutional integrity and a more disciplined business environment.

## 5.12. Average amount of bribes paid in 2025

**Table 1: Average amount of bribes paid**

Institutions	Average size of bribe (RWF)
RURA	1,000,000
Medical service	1,000,000
RRA	933,400
Prosecutors	500,000
Banks	200,940
Private sector	167,000
RNP	117,086
Judges	100,250
LG	59,702
REG	43,428
Secondary school	40,750
TVET	30,000
University	18,333
WASAC	14,400
Primary school	0
National Average	262,148




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

The data above highlights concerning trends in institutional corruption across Rwanda in 2025. RURA and medical services both show the highest average bribe at 1,000,000 Rwf, pointing to significant barriers in regulatory access and healthcare delivery. RRA follows closely with an average of 933,400 Rwf suggesting persistent issues in tax administration. Prosecutors average 500,000 Rwf, indicating potential integrity risks within the justice system. Financial institutions like banks report an average bribe of 200,940 Rwf, while RNP and the private sector show lower averages at 177,086 Rwf and 167,000 Rwf respectively. These figures reflect a layered corruption landscape where both high-level institutional processes and everyday services are affected underscoring the need for targeted reforms, digital transparency, and strengthened accountability mechanisms across sectors.

### 5.12.1. Trend for Average Amount of Bribes Paid in 2025

Figure 24: Average amount of bribes (Rwf) paid in the last 12 months (2016 – 2025)




**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**

Between 2016 and 2025, the average amount of bribes paid in Rwanda showed significant volatility, culminating in a dramatic spike in 2025. In 2016, the average stood at 43,743 RWF, followed by a slight decline to 36,173 RWF in 2017. A modest increase occurred in 2018, reaching 58,065 RWF, but the figure more than doubled in 2019 to 121,567 RWF, indicating a surge in transactional corruption. The average dropped again in 2020 to 97,529 RWF, then fell further in 2021 to 50,630 RWF, suggesting temporary improvements. However, the trend reversed in 2022 with a rise to 97,341 RWF, followed by a slight dip in 2023 to 70,633 RWF. In 2024, the average returned to 65,543 RWF, matching the 2020 level. The most striking development came in 2025, where the average bribe amount soared to 262,148 RWF nearly triple the previous year and the highest recorded in the decade. This sharp escalation may reflect increased targeting of high-value services, inflationary pressures, or a shift toward more institutionalized forms of corruption. It underscores the urgency of reinforcing anti-corruption mechanisms, particularly in sectors where bribes are not only frequent but financially burdensome.

### 5.12.2. Trend of the Total Amount of Bribes Paid in 2025

Figure 25: Total amount paid in the last 12 months (2021 – 2025)




Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

In 2025, the total amount of bribes paid was 29,532,300 Rwf. This represents an increase compared to the past editions where the total amount was 17,041,203 Rwf in 2024; 22,814,500 Rwf in 2023; 38,352,563 Rwf in 2022; and a 14,126,000 Rwf 2021.

### 5.13. Share of bribe by institutions in 2025

Figure 26: Share of bribe by institutions




Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

In 2025, the highest share of reported bribes in Rwanda was attributed to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), accounting for 32% of all cases. This indicates that tax-related services such as assessments, exemptions, and payment negotiations remain highly vulnerable to informal transactions. According to Lee (2025), corruption in tax

administration often arises when tax laws are complex and unclear, allowing officials to exploit loopholes and ambiguities. The article further explains that cumbersome procedures can frustrate taxpayers, leading them to offer bribes in exchange for faster or more favorable treatment. Local Government followed with 20%, reflecting persistent challenges in decentralized service delivery, particularly in areas like construction permits and land administration. Medical services ranked third at 17%, suggesting ongoing issues in access to treatment and procurement processes. Banks (10%) and the Rwanda National Police (9%) also showed notable shares, pointing to risks in financial facilitation and law enforcement interactions. Although institutions like RIB, REG, RURA, and the private sector registered lower percentages (2–3%), their presence confirms that corruption is not limited to public entities alone. Secondary schools and judges had the lowest shares ( $\leq 1\%$ ), but even these figures highlight that no sector is entirely immune. Overall, the data reveals that corruption in Rwanda remains concentrated in institutions with high public contact and discretionary authority, underscoring the need for stronger internal controls, transparent procedures, and citizen oversight.

**5.14. Perceived impact of bribe in 2025**

**Figure 27: Impact of bribe**



**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data**


The above figure presents findings on whether respondents have been denied the services they requested for as a result of refraining to pay a bribe.

In 2025, the perceived impact of bribery across institutions in Rwanda was relatively low overall, with an average impact of just 1.9%. However, certain sectors stood out. The private sector was seen as having the highest impact at 5%, suggesting that corrupt practices in areas like recruitment, procurement, and business facilitation are affecting service quality and fairness. Prosecutors followed at 4%, indicating public concern over how bribery may influence legal outcomes and undermine justice. Judges, Local Government, and the Rwanda National Police each registered a 2% impact, pointing to ongoing risks in case handling, administrative services, and law enforcement. WASAC, RIB, TVET, universities, and REG showed minimal perceived impact (0-1%), which may reflect either improved controls or limited public interaction. Overall, while the numerical impact appears low, the presence of corruption in justice, governance, and service delivery sectors continues to erode trust and calls for targeted reforms.

**5.15. Corruption reporting in 2025**

In this section, the reporting of bribe cases is illustrated and discussed. The survey shows whether the respondents who encountered corruption reported it or not.

*Figure 28: Reporting corruption*



*Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data*

### 5.15.1. Reasons for not reporting corruption


Figure 29: Reasons for not reporting corruption



Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

In 2025, the most common reasons Rwandans gave for not reporting corruption reveal deep challenges in public engagement and institutional trust. The top reason cited by 24% was simply that “it didn’t occur to me,” suggesting that many citizens still view corruption as normal or unavoidable. Another 16% believed that reporting would lead to no action, while 13% felt that the very institutions meant to receive reports were themselves corrupt. Fear also played a major role: 10% feared intimidation, and another 10% worried about self-incrimination. Additionally, 8% said they didn’t know where to report, pointing to gaps in public awareness and access. These findings highlight the urgent need for stronger whistleblower protections, visible enforcement of anti-corruption laws, and widespread education campaigns to shift public attitudes and empower citizens to speak out.

### 5.15.2. Satisfaction with the action taken after reporting



Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2025 primary data

In 2025, more than half of the individuals who reported corruption in Rwanda 53.85% said that no action was taken in response to their complaint. This reflects a serious gap between reporting mechanisms and institutional accountability. While 46.15% expressed satisfaction with the follow-up, the majority's experience of inaction undermines public trust and discourages future reporting. These figures suggest that even when citizens overcome fear and skepticism to report corruption, the system often fails to respond effectively. Strengthening enforcement, ensuring timely feedback, and publicly showcasing successful interventions are essential to restore confidence and encourage broader civic participation in anti-corruption efforts.



## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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The 2025 Rwanda Bribery Index findings paint a complex picture of both progress and persistent challenges in the fight against corruption. On one hand, public perception of corruption has improved significantly since 2023, with fewer citizens viewing it as widespread and many expressing optimism about future reductions. Experiences of bribery, both in terms of likelihood and prevalence, have steadily declined across most institutions, reflecting the positive impact of reforms in enforcement, transparency, and governance.

However, the data also reveals systemic weaknesses that continue to enable corruption, especially in areas involving high public contact such as local government, tax administration, utilities, construction, and business transactions. The sharp rise in the average amount of bribes paid in 2025 underscores a worrying shift toward high-value, institutionalized corruption, even as petty bribery appears to decline. Vulnerable groups such as those with lower education levels or modest incomes remain disproportionately exposed to exploitative practices, while business actors continue to use bribery strategically to secure competitive advantages. Most critically, corruption reporting remains strikingly low, with only 9.5% of victims or witnesses coming forward, often due to fear, distrust, or lack of awareness. Even among those who report, more than half see no meaningful action taken, reinforcing skepticism and discouraging broader civic participation. Without stronger whistleblower protections, visible enforcement, and accessible reporting mechanisms, the progress achieved risks stagnation.

Overall, while Rwanda has made notable strides in reducing everyday bribery and building public confidence, the persistence of corruption in strategic sectors and the lack of effective reporting responses highlight the urgent need for deeper institutional reforms. Sustaining momentum will require not only stronger accountability and transparency at all levels but also greater citizen empowerment to ensure that corruption is not only reduced in perception and prevalence but is actively challenged and dismantled across society.

Based on RBI 2025 findings, TI-Rwanda propose the following recommendations to relevant institutions.

**Table 2: Recommendations**

Issue (Likelihood)	Recommendation	Who will implement it
Private Sector	1. Mandatory Service Charters: Require companies in high-risk sectors (construction, logistics, recruitment, procurement) to publicly display service charters with timelines, procedures, and fees to reduce discretion.	Rwanda Development Board (RDB), Private Sector Federation (PSF)
	2. Integrity Pacts in Procurement: Introduce binding “no-bribe” agreements between companies and clients, monitored by independent auditors.	PSF, Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA)
	3. Training & Certification Programs: Mandatory ethics and compliance training for employees in high-risk departments (procurement, HR, customer service).	PSF, Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), Transparency International Rwanda
Traffic Police	1. Anonymous Reporting & Hotlines: Strengthen whistleblowing mechanisms where drivers can immediately report officers demanding bribes, with evidence submission (audio, video).	Office of the Ombudsman, Transparency International Rwanda
	2. Expand Use of Body Cameras: Body cameras are already in use by traffic police. Coverage should be increased to all officers, with strict monitoring of footage and disciplinary action for tampering or misconduct.	Rwanda National Police (RNP), Ministry of Interior
Local Government – Recruitment	1. Independent Oversight Panels: Involve independent observers (civil society, PSC, Ombudsman’s office) in interview panels for senior LG positions.	Public Service Commission (PSC), Office of the Ombudsman
Local Government – Procurement	1. E-Procurement Enforcement: Require all LG procurement to go through Rwanda’s electronic procurement system (UMUCYO) with no manual tenders.	Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA), MINALOC
	2. Community Monitoring of Projects: Empower citizen watchdog groups to monitor execution of LG projects (e.g., infrastructure works) and report irregularities.	District Councils, Civil Society Organizations
Local Government – Construction Permits	1. Capacity Building & Ethics Training: Provide regular training for LG inspectors on integrity, technical standards, and ethics in construction supervision.	Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), Rwanda Housing Authority (RHA), Civil Society Organizations

WASAC & REG	1. Appoint Anti-Corruption Focal Persons: Appoint anti-corruption focal persons in both WASAC and REG.	WASAC, REG
	2. Joint Whistleblowing Hotline: Establish a joint anonymous whistleblowing hotline (toll-free calls, SMS, WhatsApp) in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman and TI Rwanda. Reports go directly to the focal persons for independent follow-up.	WASAC, REG, Office of the Ombudsman, Transparency International Rwanda
Low reporting of corruption by victims in Rwanda	1. Develop a secure, anonymous, and easy-to-use digital reporting platform accessible via mobile apps, SMS, and websites to protect reporters' identities.	Office of Ombudsman, RIB, MINICT
	2. Establish dedicated anti-corruption desks in all public institutions and private enterprises to collect and address corruption complaints.	Office of Ombudsman, Local Government, PSF
	3. Strengthen legal frameworks to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, ensuring that laws are effectively enforced.	RIB, NPPA, Ministry of Justice

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**Transparency International Rwanda**

P.O. Box 6252 Kigali, Rwanda

Tel. +250 (0) 788309583

Toll free: 2641 (to report cases of corruption)

E-mail: [Info@tirwanda.org](mailto:Info@tirwanda.org)

Website: [www.tirwanda.org](http://www.tirwanda.org)